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INTRODUCTION
In the late 1880s and early 1890s, a Paiute Indian named
Wovoka preached a new religion to the Indians of the American
West. Wovoka taught the Indians to perform a Ghost Dance that
would lift them up to the heavens with their fallen comrades while
the whites were destroyed by a great flood which swept across the
* Law Clerk for the Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit; B.A. 1986, M.A. 1987, Stanford University; J.D. 1992, Stanford Law School. The
author thanks Professor Hank Greely for reviewing earlier drafts of this article, Attorney
General Nicholas Spaeth of North Dakota, and also his brother, Jack Morris, who knows that
any river is worth more than a dam.
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land. The Indians would then return to earth to reclaim their land
and once again the slaughtered buffalo would roam the plains.
Nowhere was the Ghost Dance better received than on the
Sioux lands in present-day South Dakota. The Sioux readily took to
the new religion and began performing Ghost Dances across their
reservations. The Seventh United States Cavalry, sent to restore
order, intercepted a ragged band of cold and hungry Sioux, mostly
women and children, led by Big Foot fleeing to safety in the Pine
Ridge agency on December 28, 1890.' The out-numbered Sioux
surrendered and began the forced march to Wounded Knee,
South Dakota. Confusion erupted the next morning while the
soldiers disarmed the Sioux. The soldiers responded with brutal
force, gunning down the defenseless prisoners. In the end, nearly
300 of the 350 Sioux lay dead.2 The soldiers lost twenty-five men,
most of them struck by their own bullets and shrapnel.3
In a strange way, it seems that Wovoka may have been a cen-
tury ahead of his time, but now the gods wear the uniform of the
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps). Residents of the upper basin
states of Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota feel that the
Corps deprives them of economic opportunities and that this dep-
rivation speeds the departure of white residents from the region.
The Corps' management policies on the reservoirs of the Missouri
River Basin System favor the relatively small and localized naviga-
tion industry in the lower basin over the growing recreation indus-
try in the upper basin states. These policies leave upper basin
states with few opportunities for sustained economic develop-
ment. The Missouri River Basin System, authorized by the Pick-
Sloan Plan of 1944, promised economic prosperity to the upper
basin through numerous irrigation projects for parched farmers in
the arid region and cheap hydroelectric power produced from the
planned dams on the river. Figure 1 shows the Missouri River
Basin and the location of the main stem reservoirs. Most of the
irrigation projects failed to materialize due to budget constraints
and much of the electricity produced by the dams on the system is
shipped out of the region.
Surprisingly, the recreation industry on the reservoirs backed
up behind the huge dams in the upper basin developed as a conso-
lation prize for these states. Sport fishing and other water sports
1. DEE BROWN, BURY My HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE, AN INDIAN HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN WEST 440 (1970).
2. Id. at 444.
3. Id.
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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
bring tourists to the reservoirs and jobs to the sparsely-populated
upper basin states. But now, a six-year drought that lowered reser-
voir levels threatens the future viability of this consolation prize.
The Corps' adherence to a policy that discharges water from the
reservoirs faster than it is being replenished in order to keep
barges afloat in the lower basin exacerbates the threat. The dis-
charges led to massive fish kills, marinas and boat ramps suffered,
and water-users found their intake pipes high and dry. The con-
tinuing loss of family farms and now the threat to the recreation
industry only accelerates the exodus of people from the upper
basin states. The population in parts of western Nebraska has
fallen by half since 1930, and fewer people live in North Dakota
today than in 1920.4 The Ghost Dance prayers of the Sioux may
finally be answered.
The upper basin states filed a lawsuit in federal district court
in Billings, Montana, to prevent these prayers from being
answered. The suit challenges the Corps' management priorities
set out in its Master Manual.5 The Master Manual places a higher
priority on navigation than recreation despite the huge disparities
in value of the activities to the basin.6 The Corps has repeatedly
claimed that it lacks statutory authority to modify project opera-
tions to benefit recreation at the expense of navigation and
power.7 The projected outcome in the courts is murky due to the
inherent dangers involved in discerning legislative intent from the
cold pages of the congressional debate. Regardless of the suit's
outcome, the time has come for the Corps to face economic reality
and develop management policies that favor those activities that
benefit the greatest number of people in the basin.
Part I of this article describes the geography, climate and
resources of the Missouri River Basin. Part II examines the back-
ground of the Pick-Sloan Plan, both as envisioned by its propo-
nents in 1944, and the actual results of that plan today. Part III
analyzes the current lawsuit filed by the upper basin states against
the Corps and attempts to unravel the legislative intent of the pro-
4. The Missouri River, Back to Nature?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 13, 1990, at 29
[hereinafter Missouri River]. The 1990 population estimates in the upper basin states rank
as follows: North Dakota - 639,000, South Dakota - 696,000, and Montana - 799,000.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1991 20 (11 1th
ed. 1991).
5. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-RCED-92-4, WATER RESOURCES: CORPS'
MANAGEMENT OF ONGOING DROUGHT IN THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN 32 (Jan. 1992)
[hereinafter CORPS' MANAGEMENT].
6. Id.
7. Id.
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ponents of the Pick-Sloan Plan through a brief review of the legis-
lative history. Part IV offers an alternative view on how the Corps
should operate the Missouri River system. Finally, the article con-
cludes with a possible explanation behind the Corps' apparent
unwillingness to face economic realities in its management of the
Missouri River system and other waterways throughout the nation.
I. BACKGROUND
A. GEOGRAPHY OF THE MISSOURI RIVER BASIN
The Missouri River Basin encompasses parts of ten states and
two nations8 that form the heart of the Great Plains of North
America. The drainage basin is bound on the west by the Conti-
nental Divide and formed by the Rocky Mountains; on the north
by a less dramatic elevation separating it from the Hudson Bay
drainage, including the Red River; on the east by the Mississippi
River drainage; and on the south by the Ozark Uplift and an east-
west ridge across central Kansas that separates it from the Arkan-
sas River drainage.9 The Missouri rises in Three Forks in south-
western Montana at the confluence of the Jefferson, Madison and
Gallatin Rivers and begins its 2,500 mile journey to the Mississippi
River near St. Louis, Missouri."° The Missouri, with the lower Mis-
sissippi River which it joins in St. Louis, Missouri, is the longest
river in the United States and the fourth longest in the world."
The Missouri flows north to Fort Benton, Montana before
turning east for a 400 mile run to Garrison, North Dakota.' 2 Near
the Montana-North Dakota border, almost 1,000 miles from its
source, the Missouri picks up the waters of Yellowstone River and
becomes formidable. From Garrison the river moves south to
Sioux City, Iowa and Kansas City after it captures the Platte and
Niobara Rivers in Nebraska and the Kansas and James Rivers in
Kansas. 3 The Missouri again heads east at Kansas City, across the
State of Missouri, to its confluence with the Mississippi River sev-
8. U.S. ARMY ENG'R DIv., WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT BY THE U.S. ARMY
CORPS OF ENGINEERS IN MISSOURI 19 (Jan. 1985) [hereinafter WATER RESOURCES]. It
drains all of Nebraska, large parts of North Dakota and South Dakota, all of Montana and
Wyoming east of the Continental Divide, parts of Colorado, Iowa, Kansas and Missouri, and
a small part of Minnesota. The Basin also includes parts of Alberta and Saskatchewan,
Canada. Id.
9. Id.
10. MICHAEL C. ROBINSON, WATER FOR THE WEST, THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
1902-1977 83 (1979).
11. Missouri River, supra note 4, at 28.
12. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 83.
13. Id.
1992]
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enteen miles north of St. Louis.' a Along the way the Missouri
drains an area covering roughly 530,000 square miles, nearly one-
sixth of the surface area of the continental United States, including
9,715 miles in Canada."5
Narrow canyons and rugged mountains characterize the
upper Missouri Basin from Three Forks to Fort Benton, with ele-
vations of the surrounding lands ranging from 13,000 feet on the
highest mountain peaks to 3,320 feet on the valley floors near the
end of this section.16 The Missouri enters the Great Plains prov-
ince near Great Falls, Montana, where it flows through the physio-
graphic subdivisions known as the Glaciated and Unglaciated
Missouri Plateau. The topography features smoothly sloping ter-
race lands and local badlands, with elevations that range from
5,000 feet to 1,210 feet. At a point about forty miles above Yank-
ton, South Dakota the river enters a region that features dissected
till plains of the central lowlands until it reaches Kansas City.
There the river flows east along the northern edge of the Osage
Plains and the Ozark Plateau. Finally, at a point near St. Charles,
Missouri it re-enters the central lowlands to join the Mississippi
River.' 7
Rainfall levels along the basin vary dramatically with the
changing landscape as the Missouri makes its way downstream.
The ninety-seventh meridian marks the dividing line between the
Middle West's humid areas and the West's semi-arid and arid
areas, as well as between the upper basin and.lower basin.' 8 Near
the eastern boundaries of the Dakotas, the meridian divides about
one-fourth of Nebraska and Kansas from their western portions,
while Missouri and Iowa lie wholly to the east of the line. 19 The
lower basin incorporates all of these regions east of the ninety-sev-
enth meridian.2 ° Rainfall levels in the lower basin region can
reach as high as forty-four inches annually."' This wetter climate
facilitates crop production and makes irrigation a much lower pri-
ority for farmers in the lower basin region. By contrast, some
regions of the upper basin receive as little as six inches of annual
14. Id.
15. WATER RESOURCES, supra note 8, at 19. In addition, the Missouri River Basin
contains 113 million acres or 25% of the nation's cropland, 175 million acres of grassland, 45
million acres of forest and woodland and 7 million acres used for cities, towns and roads. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. MARIAN E. RIDGEWAY, THE MISSOURI BASIN'S PICK-SLOAN PLAN 48 (1955).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. WATER RESOURCES, supra note 8, at 19.
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precipitation,22 with none of the upper basin states averaging
more than fourteen inches annually.23 Most crops require a mini-
mum of fifteen inches of rain per year to produce and this rain
must fall almost wholly within the growing season for it to be effec-
tive. Due to these paltry rainfall amounts, most regions of the
upper basin require irrigation in order to sustain agriculture.
Another fact further dramatizes the aridity of the region. Despite
being the twelfth longest river in the world, the Missouri ranks
only seventh in the United States in terms of annual flow.
24
The agriculture practiced in the two regions before the build-
ing of the Pick-Sloan projects reflected the differing availability of
water between the upper and lower basin states. Farmers in the
lower basin grew corn, wheat and a variety of small grains, while
farmers in the arid upper basin were limited to range livestock
and some wheat and small grains.25 Thus, it seems nearly inevita-
ble that the varied geography, climate and landscape of the basin
would lead to disputes over which activities should have higher
priorities in this massive region.
B. COMPETING AGENCIES
1. US. Army Corps of Engineers
The civilian branch of the Corps began clearing driftwood and
sunken ships out of the nation's waterways right after the Revolu-
tionary War. The Corps surveyed land and waterways throughout
the nineteenth century.26 By the end of the century, the Corps
concentrated its activities on navigation and flood control. The
Corps dredged and straightened rivers and deepened harbors to
accommodate barge and ship traffic and to facilitate deep-draft
ships. Originally the Corps controlled floods by building levees
and dikes rather than dams and reservoirs, in part because the
Corps confined most of its activities to the East and Middle West
until the Depression in the 1930s. 28 The East offered very few
steep canyons or natural basins in which to site dams and
22. Id.
23. MONT. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MONTANA AGRICULTURAL STATISTICS 8 (1990). Annual
precipitation levels in central Montana, the highest in the upper basin, average 13.72
inches. Id.
24. MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT, THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 189 (1986).
25. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 57.
26. Id. at 19.
27. REISNER, supra note 24, at 179-80.
28. Id. at 180.
1992] 903
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29reservoirs.
The Corps broke out of its self-imposed confinement to the
East in the 1930s and soon discovered the virtues of dams and res-
ervoirs as part of comprehensive flood control programs. The
dams built by the Corps possessed a distinct advantage for irriga-
tors in the West over those built by its rival, the Bureau of Recla-
mation: the irrigation water from a dam built chiefly for flood
control by the Corps was free.30
Today the Corps engages in a dizzying array of tasks. It con-
tinues to promote navigation by straightening and deepening riv-
ers and harbors. Its flood control tools now include building dams
and reservoirs, as well as riprapping rivers and constructing lev-
ees. In addition, the Corps builds fish hatcheries and regulates pri-
vate dredging and filling of waterways.3 '
2. Bureau of Reclamation
The 1902 Reclamation Act32 authorized the federal govern-
ment to develop water storage facilities in promising locations
throughout the West. The government agreed to deliver water to
irrigators under contract, and "recover its costs through payments
that the irrigators would make over time from the profits of their
newly irrigated land."' 33 According to the once popular phrase,
"reclamation would pay its own way."34
The Reclamation Act authorized the Secretary of Interior to
administer the development, but it established no program to do
the work.3' The former Division of Hydrography was expanded
and transformed into the Reclamation Service within the U.S.
Geological Survey. In 1907, the Reclamation Service became an
independent agency within the Department of Interior.36 There
it remains.
The Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) completed its first major
project, Roosevelt Dam, on the Salt River in southern Arizona in
1911. 3 ' Today, the Bureau's vast empire extends across the West
with over 300 dams, 7000 miles of canals and aqueducts, 50 hydro-
29. Id. at 181.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 179-81.
32. 43 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
33. JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 644 (2d ed. 1991).
34. Id.
35. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 19.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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electric generators, and 140 pumping stations.38 The Bureau cur-
rently supplies irrigation water to over twenty percent of all
irrigated acreage in the West, and drinking water to an additional
twenty million domestic users.
39
While partial subsidization of the water projects to benefit
small farmers may have been envisioned at the time of the
Bureau's inception, even the program's strongest congressional
supporters would be surprised to discover the magnitude of the
subsidies that exist today. The original 1902 Act required that irri-
gators repay the costs of a project interest-free within ten years.
The Act also prohibited the sale of water from the projects to any
tract of land greater than 160 acres held by one owner, and
required farmers receiving water to live within 50 miles of the irri-
gated land.40 Little remains of these initial repayment plans.
Congress significantly loosened all of these requirements
throughout the intervening years. It extended the payback period
to fifty years, with the first ten years considered a "development
period," requiring no payments. 4' This revision amounted to a
ninety percent subsidy at today's interest rates.42 In addition, the
Reclamation Act of 1939 permitted the Bureau to shift any project
costs exceeding the irrigator's "ability to pay" to other project ben-
eficiaries, such as power consumers and recreation.43 This policy
led to the "multiple-purpose" concept used to justify later
projects. By the 1930s, the Bureau also ignored the residency
requirement and stopped objecting when farmers managed to cir-
cumvent the 160-acre limitation.44
With all of the prime projects built by the 1930s, even these
concessions could not justify the construction costs of more major
reclamation projects.4" "[T]he Bureau devised the plan of consid-
ering an entire river basin development program as an integrated
project."'46 In this way, the Bureau could offset construction and
development costs of inefficient projects with revenue from power
38. SAX, supra note 33, at 621 n.3.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 645.
41. Id. at 645 & n.3.
42. Id. at 645.
43. SAX, supra note 33, at 645.
44. Id. at 646. Farmers managed to avoid the acreage limitations through a series of
disingenuous efforts. These efforts included simply leasing land from small farmers who
qualified for the subsidized federal water. In addition, farmers resorted to family trusts and
multi-party ownership devices that granted title to separate 160-acre parcels to different
parties, but operated by the same entity. By 1979, these farms constituted over 75 percent
of the total acreage furnished with water by the Bureau. Id.
45. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 77.
46. Id.
9051992]
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production, flood control, and recreational resources at other more
profitable dams on the same system.47 The advent of multiple-
purpose development allowed the Bureau to move ahead with
basin-wide plans for several western rivers-the Missouri River
among them. One caveat should be noted regarding multiple-pur-
pose river development: the operation of one component of the
system, such as hydroelectric power production, may be subject to
constraints imposed by successful operation of other components
of the system, such as flood control and navigation.48  This con-
straint can, and often did, lead to conflicts between users of com-
peting components of the system.
C. FLOODING ON THE MISSOURI RIVER BEFORE THE PICK-
SLOAN PLAN
The Missouri River ran almost completely uncontrolled before
1940 when the Corps completed the 140-mile-long Fort Peck Res-
ervoir in eastern Montana. Fort Peck, originally designated as a
flood control reservoir, marked the Corps' first major attempt to
ease the recurring cycles of drought and flooding that plagued the
basin. Discharge from the Missouri at Herman, Missouri, where it
enters the Mississippi, had been measured as low as 4,200 cubic
feet per second (cfs). 49 By contrast, in June 1944, this same dis-
charge measured 892,000 cfs-enough water in a day to satisfy
New York City for seventy years.50 Additionally, prior to the con-
struction of reservoirs on the main stem under the Pick-Sloan
Plan, the lack of a confining canyon exacerbated potential flooding
problems as the Missouri rolled across the plains. 51 Instead, low
bluffs as far apart as ten miles held the river in check. These bluffs
did little good and the river made lateral migrations of a half mile
in a single day.5 2 The unpredictable river flooded throughout its
course about once a decade, and localized flooding occurred more
47. Id.
48. JOHN V. KRUTILLA & OTTO ECKSTEIN, MULTIPLE PURPOSE RIVER DEVELOPMENT
66 (1958). In contrast to the conflicts between competing uses created by multiple-purpose
river development, similar uses can actually benefit from the system. For example,
hydroelectric power production at dams that are part of an integrated system can be
greater than if the dams were separate power producers. Coordinating storage releases
from upstream dams can increase power production at downstream hydroelectric facilities
by increasing the minimum flow of water to the downstream dam, and extending the
critical period of the system beyond the normal spring run-off season. Id. at 67.
49. Cubic feet per second is the "'quantity of water flowing at a velocity of one foot per
second through a box one foot wide and one foot deep. [lI]t is equivalent to 448.8 gallons
per minute or slightly more than 646,000 gallons per day." SAX, supra note 33, at 972.
50. REISNER, supra note 24, at 189-90.
51. Id. at 190.
52. Id.
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frequently.5 3 By 1940, some estimates set the flood damage
caused by the Missouri and its tributaries as high as $77 million per
year.54 This flooding hit the upper and lower basin states in differ-
ent degrees. According to the Department of Agriculture's esti-
mates in 1945, the lower basin states were hit with seventeen
times more average annual flood damage than the upper basin
states.5
Despite the heavy flood damage caused by the Missouri, only
small-scale projects had been undertaken to alleviate the pressure
on lower basin communities imperiled by the high waters. The
government did not build any dams on the main stem Missouri
River prior to the Fort Peck Reservoir due to the high costs and
discouraging economic projections for such projects. First, irriga-
tion farming in cold, high-altitude terrain seemed to be a losing
proposition for the Bureau of Reclamation; therefore, reservoirs
built for storing irrigation water could not survive cost-benefit
analysis. The Bureau often justified inefficient water storage
projects with hydroelectric power production from the dams, but
that option did not exist on the Missouri. The volume of water
available and the height of the drop of the water before it passes
through the turbines, known as the head, determine hydroelectric
power output. Plenty of water flowed in the Missouri during good
years, but the lack of suitable canyons made the high dams-nec-
essary for efficient hydroelectric power production-impossible to
build. Further, the shallow, wildly meandering Missouri that
snaked its way across the Great Plains did not offer much potential
for the navigation industry and barge traffic within the bailiwick of
the Corps. In fact, one commentator wryly noted that "[t]he
trouble with going up the Missouri in a boat is that you have to
take the boat along."'56 Prospects for any large-scale flood control
projects within the Missouri River Basin seemed bleak before Con-
gress passed a major flood control act in 1936." 7 The act provided
funds and refocused attention on the needs of the often neglected
Basin.
53. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 50.
54. ROBINSON, supra note 10, at 83.
55. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 51. Average annual flood damage in the lower basin
states totalled approximately $12,371,000, compared to about $736,000 in the upper basin
states. Id.
56. STANLEY VESTAL, THE MISSOURI 11 (1945).
57. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 72-73. The omnibus rivers and harbors laws
authorized the construction of flood control and navigation projects throughout the nation.
Thirty-eight reservoirs, including Fort Peck, and ninety-two local flood protection plans
were completed under the acts. Fort Peck, completed in 1940 as a flood control project,
was the only major flood control project built on the Missouri during this period. Id.
1992] 907
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II. PICK-SLOAN PLAN
A. COMPETING PLANS
Three big floods during March, May and June of 1943 inun-
dated the Missouri River Basin and riveted public attention to the
flooding problems. The June flood left the streets of Omaha and
Kansas City navigable by boat. These disasters provided the final
impetus for Congress to appropriate money for public works
projects along the Missouri. Colonel Lewis Pick, director of the
Corps' regional office in Omaha who was chased to higher ground
during the last flood, quickly dispatched a twelve-page report on
harnessing the Missouri to Washington. This report became
known as the "Pick Plan." The original Pick Plan emphasized
flood control and navigation, with some accommodation for hydro-
electric power to be produced at major dams. The plan proposed
construction of a 9-foot-deep, 300-foot-wide navigation channel in
the river from Sioux City, Iowa to its mouth, and 1,500 miles of
levees along the river's main stem in the same area. 8 In addition,
the Corps' plan called for five enormous reservoirs in the upper
basin between Fort Peck in eastern Montana and Yankton, South
Dakota.59 "Eight hundred miles of the Missouri would be trans-
formed into a chain of shallow, turbid reservoirs. "60 The six main
stem dams, the five in the plan plus the already constructed Fort
Peck,61 proposed the back-up of almost 90 million acre-feet of
water, an amount sufficient to cover an area the size of Penn-
sylvania in a foot of water. 2 The Corps placed the price tag for
the plan at a seemingly low $660 million in 1944 dollars.63 The
plan's focus on flood control can be seen in the report outlining the
project which was submitted to Congress by the Secretary of War.
The report stated:
In addition to providing flood-control benefits on the Mis-
souri and Mississippi Rivers, the comprehensive plan
58. Id. at 74.
59. REISNER, supra note 24, at 191.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 191-92. Fort Peck Reservoir alone extends 134 miles west from the dam and
covers 249,000 acres when the lake is full. The dam, which stretches four miles across the
Missouri River Valley, is the largest hydraulic fill dam in the world. Earth was pumped
from the Missouri River bottom to fill the dam. Quest for Water: Interests Battle for Waters
of Fort Peck, BILLINGS GAZETTE, June 3, 1990, at El [hereinafter Quest for Water].
62. REISNER, supra note 24, at 191-92. An acre-foot is the "quantity of water required
to cover 1 acre to a depth of 1 foot, or 325,851 gallons." SAX, supra note 33, at 971.
63. REISNER, supra note 24, at 192. The Corps' price was about one-half of that
projected by the Bureau for nearly the same system. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 81.
Initial estimates were even more optimistic. Brigadier General John J. Kingman
summarized the total costs of the Pick Plan to be about $490 million. Id. at 79 & n.26.
908 [Vol. 68:897
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would also provide for the most efficient utilization of the
waters of the Missouri River Basin for all purposes, includ-
ing irrigation, navigation, power, domestic and sanitary
purposes, wildlife, and recreation.64
To get the process started, Colonel Pick and other Corps officials,
at the behest of the Corps' lobbying staff, undertook an ambitious
campaign to promote the Pick Plan throughout the basin states.
The lobbyists set up meetings and programs with local farm
groups, chambers of commerce and other potential beneficiaries
of the plan. This "spade work," which promised different benefits
depending on the audience, persuaded local communities to pres-
sure their congressional representatives for action on the plan.65
The Bureau of Reclamation frantically completed the "Sloan
Plan," its own Missouri River plan, after hearing about the Pick
Plan prepared by the Corps. Not surprisingly, the Sloan Plan, pre-
pared by W.G. Sloan, an assistant engineer in the Bureau's Billings,
Montana office, gave heavy emphasis to reclamation and irriga-
tion.6" The Bureau saw the whole future of the West directly or
indirectly dependent on irrigation. With 21,000,000 acres of
reclaimed land already under irrigation, the Bureau felt that the
West had possibilities for the development of an additional
22,000,000 acres.6 The hastily prepared Sloan Plan was nearly as
ambitious as its rival. Despite the previously cited drawbacks asso-
ciated with irrigation farming in cold, high-altitude climates, the
final plan proposed a catch basin of ninety dams and several hun-
dred individual irrigation projects concentrated in the upper basin
states.68 The Bureau hoped to provide enough water to irrigate a
total of 4.7 million acres of land. This was an ambitious goal for the
1940s considering that today, even with modern pumps and irriga-
tion systems available, Montana manages to irrigate just slightly
more than 2.8 million acres in the entire state.69 The Bureau
planned to offset these costs by building 17 power plants having an
aggregate installed capacity of 758,000 kilowatts capable of gener-
64. H.R. Doc. NO. 475, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1943), reprinted in U. S. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 87TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESS., AN
ANALYSIS OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE O'MAHONEY-
MILLIKIN AMENDMENT TO THE FLOOD CONTROL ACT OF 1944 AND CERTAIN OTHER
PUBLIC LAWS 5 (1961) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL AND INSULAR AFFAIRS].
65. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 10-16.
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 61.
68. REISNER, supra note 24, at 193.
69. Matthew J. McKinney, et al., The Protection of Instream Flows in Montana: A
Legal-Institutional Perspective, INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST 287, 287
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell et al. eds., 1989).
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ating 3.8 billion kilowatt-hours of firm electricity annually.7 0 The
Bureau set the price for the Sloan Plan at the slightly more realis-
tic figure of $1.2 billion, with $200 million to be spent on the initial
construction.7 1
By contrast, the Corps eschewed power production in the
Pick Plan in favor of flood control. Its proposed dams were all too
low or poorly situated to draw the power potential out of the river.
This omission was quickly caught up in the public power contro-
versy that had generated heated debate throughout the first half of
this century. Proponents of public power, including the Bureau of
Reclamation, advocated that power produced at dams built by the
United States be made available to public entities at the lowest
possible cost in order to speed rural electrification.7 2 While elec-
tricity served only thirty-seven percent of all farms in the seven-
teen western states by 1944, an even grimmer situation existed in
the Missouri River Basin.7 3 Electricity served only seven percent
of the farms in North Dakota, ten percent in South Dakota,
twenty-five percent in Montana, twenty-six percent in Nebraska,
twenty-five percent in Kansas, and twenty-three percent in Mis-
74souri. ' These numbers contrasted sharply with California at
eighty-seven percent, and Oregon and Washington with seventy-
five percent.7 5 All of these west coast states sat in close proximity
to major hydroelectric power sources on the Columbia and Colo-
rado rivers.
The Bureau also objected to the Corps' proposed storage facil-
ities which were far down river from the lands that the Bureau
wanted to irrigate, and many of them were located in what the
Bureau felt were wastelands unsuitable for irrigation. 6 Further,
the Bureau took exception with the Pick Plan's call for flooding
some of the most valuable winter cattle range in North Dakota
70. COMMITrEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 64, at 4. A kilowatt,
or one thousand watts, is "[a] unit of measure for the amount of electricity needed to
operate given equipment." CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, ENERGY GLOSSARY 25 (1990). A
kilowatt hour is one kilowatt of electricity supplied for one hour. Id. at 26.
71. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 86. The Bureau enumerated the annual benefits
which would reimburse the government as follows: Irrigation-$130 million, power-$17.1
million, flood control-$16.5 million, navigation-$4.1 million, and municipal water-
$500,000. Id.
72. John P. Guhin, The Law of the Missouri, 30 S.D. L. REV. 346, 437 (1985). Public
power proponents in rural areas often advocated that revenues produced by the power
should be deposited in a special account to benefit irrigation projects associated with the
power project. Id.
73. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 61.
74. Id. .
75. Id. at 61-62.
76. REISNER, supra note 24, at 192.
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that happened to be on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation.7 7
The Bureau reacted similarly unimpressed with the Corps' ambi-
tious plans for flood control. W.G. Sloan testified before Congress
that "'the 1943 flood could have been regulated to a safe capacity
... at Sioux City, Omaha, and Kansas City with only 2 million acre-
feet in storage'."'7' The Pick Plan called for 90 million acre-feet of
storage capacity. 9
Neither agency ever showed that sufficient water existed
within the Missouri River Basin to satisfy all the purposes named.
The two agencies based their respective estimates upon different
precipitation cycles. The Sloan Plan chose a dry cycle of years to
demonstrate what the minimum rainfall expectation might be,
while the Corps, with their focus on flood control and navigation,
selected a wet year cycle for its computations.8 0 Nevertheless, by
1943, the issue was not a matter of whether to develop some sort
of development plan for the Missouri River Basin, but choosing
which one to develop. Interest groups in the region could be
roughly divided into four camps: those who favored the Pick Plan
and its emphasis on flood control and development of navigation,
those favoring the Sloan Plan with its focus on irrigation, propo-
nents of a compromise of the two competing plans, and finally,
those who felt that neither plan alone was adequate, and that a
centralized agency having complete control, similar to the Ten-
nessee Valley Authority (TVA) ought to be created. Proponents of
the latter group saw it as a vehicle for insuring development of
public power to speed rural electrification.'
B. RECONCILIATION OF THE PLANS
1. Shotgun Wedding
Congress faced the challenge of choosing between two irrec-
oncilable large public works projects, each championed by a pow-
erful bureaucracy with a sophisticated lobbying mechanism and
backed by enthusiastic support throughout the Basin.8 2 Forced to
choose, Congress picked both. With the two plans stalemated in
Congress, President Roosevelt attempted to break the impasse.
77. Id. The reservation was home to the Mandan, Hiditsa and Arikara tribes. Lewis
and Clark spent their first winter with the Mandan tribe in North Dakota and later their
adopted Shoshone-Mandan interpreter, Sacajawea, probably saved their lives. Id. at 194.
78. Id. at 192.
79. Id. at 191-92.
80. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 9-10.
81. Id. at 10.
82. REISNER, supra note 24, at 193.
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Roosevelt sent Congress a strongly worded letter stating that the
solution to developing the Missouri Basin was to create a regional
authority, similar to the TVA, and take development out of both
agencies' hands.8 3 Senator James E. Murray of Montana champi-
oned the considerable congressional support for this type of
regional authority. Faced with the possible loss of control of any
part of the project, the Bureau and the Corps quickly met to ham-
mer out the differences in the two plans. In a series of meetings
over two days, the two sides "reconciled" the competing plans into
a comprehensive Pick-Sloan Plan for development of the entire
Basin.84 The alleged reconciliation entailed nothing more than an
agreement to combine the two plans lock, stock and barrel, with
each side responsible for constructing and operating those por-
tions of the project it favored.8" Thus, the Corps would build and
operate projects primarily useful for flood control and navigation,
and the Bureau would be responsible for those projects devoted
primarily to irrigation and power production. 6 One significant
point of the reconciliation proved to have far reaching conse-
quences. The Bureau decided to let the Corps build its huge main
stem reservoirs first while the money was available, and postpone
its own projects in the upper basin until after these main stem res-
ervoirs were in place. It was a fateful decision for the Bureau,
because little money proved to be available when it was finally
ready to go ahead with its projects. The Bureau's acquiescence
prompted one lobbyist to dryly state that "'[t]he Corps got the
here and now, . . . [t]he Bureau got the then and later'." '
2. O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment
The proposed reconciliation, by itself, failed to overcome the
fears of the western state members of Congress who worried that
their water and hopes of economic development would be washed
downstream to float the barges favored by the Corps. Only the
adoption of the O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment assured congres-
sional approval of the combined development plan. Senators
Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming and Eugene Millikin of Colorado
introduced a series of amendments designed to protect the inter-
ests of arid western states in this and future projects contemplated
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. REISNER, supra note 24, at 194.
912 [Vol. 68:897
BASIN STATES VERSUS THE CORPS
by the Bureau and Corps."" The most important provision for our
purposes dealt with the priority of uses in the operation of the sys-
tem. An amendment to the Flood Control Act of 1944 stated:
(c) The use for navigation, in connection with the opera-
tion and maintenance of such works herein or hereafter
authorized for construction, of waters arising west of the
ninety-seventh meridian shall be subordinate to and shall
not adversely affect at any time the beneficial consump-
tive use, west of the ninety-seventh meridian, of such
waters for domestic, irrigation, mining, or industrial
purposes.8 9
The "beneficial consumptive use" phrase proved to be enough to
win support from the concerned western members of Congress,
but their failure to define the term caused problems later. To
insure passage, however, the Corps continued to lobby heavily and
promised all things to all parties. For example, in response to a
question before the House Committee on Flood Control of
whether the construction of the main stem reservoirs could con-
flict with the vested rights of water users in the upper basin, Colo-
nel Miles Reber of the Corps responded emphatically: "I do not
see how they possibly could, Mr. Chairman. They are below the
general region in which water rights exist and there is absolutely
no priority of water use set up in the [Pick Plan] in any way
whatsoever .... -90
Accordingly, one could argue that because of these vague
promises made by representatives of the Corps, Congress envi-
sioned broad-scale development based on whatever needs would
arise in the area to be served and that any preference between
conflicting uses should be determined based on which use would
make the greatest contribution to the well-being of the people and
the areas of greatest need.9" The vague language in the two
88. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 91.
89. Id. at 335 (emphasis added).
90. Hearings on H.R. 4485 Before the Committee on Flood Control, 78th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1060 (1943). The ability of the parties to lobby successfully behind the scenes in
addition to testifying before congressional committees and the readiness of the members of
Congress to accept the vague language of the reports is perhaps best illustrated by the fact
that the entire Senate floor debate on the O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment occupies little
more than one page in the Congressional Record and most of it took place after its
acceptance. COMMITEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 64, at 9.
91. H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1943). The Chief of Engineers of the
Corps stated that "[ilt is evident that all the Federal agencies concerned agree that the
maximum feasible multiple-purpose use of the water and the broadest economic program
of reservoirs for that type of use are the primary principles on which the planned
development of the water resources of the Missouri River Valley should be based." Id.
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reports and the postponing of specifics allowed both sides to argue
comfortably that all could benefit from adoption of the combined
programs. Along these lines, the Chief of Engineers of the Corps
reiterated the evolving nature of the plan to a congressional com-
mittee. He stated:
Due allowance must be made for any changed conditions
that may arise in the future.... The adjustment of water
use to meet the changing needs of the Missouri Basin as a
whole can and will be made as the comprehensive devel-
opment proceeds step by step toward ultimate accom-
plishment. When completed the basin plan will be
operated for maximum multiple purpose use. Thus pref-
erence can be given to the functions which contribute
most significantly to the welfare and livelihood of the peo-
ple of various parts of the basin, and at the same time ade-
quate steps can be taken to meet new economic situations
that may arise in the future.92
The agencies labeled all reservoirs included in the joint plan
"multi-purpose," which included "flood control, navigation, irriga-
tion, power, domestic and sanitary purposes, wildlife and recrea-
tion.... - Even the Fort Peck Reservoir which had been built by
the Corps primarily to aid navigation would be converted to a
multiple-purpose dam operated primarily for irrigation.94 This
multi-purpose designation allowed the Corps and the Bureau to
allocate the costs of the system to all of the different uses to
enhance its cost effectiveness.
When Congress finally enacted the Flood Control Act of 1944
which included both the Pick and Sloan Plans for comprehensive
development of the Missouri River Basin, it did not bother setting
out the plan in the words of the statute. Rather, Congress adopted
by reference the Pick Plan9 5 and the Sloan Plan96 as revised and
coordinated by a third document, the Joint Report.9 7 They left the
details of the daily operation of the reservoirs on the system to be
worked out later. Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to
promulgate "regulations for the use of storage allocated for flood
control or navigation at all reservoirs constructed wholly or in part
92. Id.
93. S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1944).
94. Id.
95. H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
96. S. Doc. No. 191, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
97. S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
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with Federal funds provided on the basis of such purposes, and the
operation of any such project shall be in accordance with any such
regulations . . 98 The Secretary's regulations provided that
"[w]ater control plans developed for specific projects and reservoir
systems will be clearly documented in appropriate water control
manuals. '
It appears now that the upper basin states made a terrible mis-
calculation by accepting the vague language of the reports and
relying on the assurances of the Corps that the system would
evolve to meet the changing needs of the basin. Fears that their
small populations and limited congressional clout would make get-
ting their own development programs authorized nearly impossi-
ble may have led them to sign on to the Pick-Sloan Plan despite its
obvious lack of specifics and potential drawbacks for their region.
C. MISSOURI RIVER BASIN SYSTEM AFTER PICK-SLOAN
1. Results of the Legislation
The plan that Congress envisioned when it approved the Pick-
Sloan Plan for development of the Missouri River Basin in 1944
and what exists in the Basin today after more than $7 billion has
been spent are two different things.' 0 The Corps went ahead
with its plans to build the navigation channel below Sioux City,
Iowa and to construct the 1,500 miles of levees. But projected
barge traffic failed to materialize. Only six tows that push thirty-
five barges operate on the Missouri below Sioux City. Navigation
tonnage on the Missouri peaked in 1977 at a disappointingly low
3.3 million tons, far below the 12 to 20 million ton capacity.' 0 '
The volume had slipped to only 1.5 million tons by 1990.102 In
contrast, Mississippi River barges carry over 380 million tons per
year and those on the Ohio River move at least 150 million tons
each year,' 0 3 and even the Tennessee River carries more than five
times the cargo shipped on the Missouri.' 0 4 The Corps estimates
98. 33 U.S.C. § 709 (1988).
99. 33 C.F.R. § 222.7(fX3) (1991).
100. Byron L. Dorgan, Water in the West, WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 1991, at A20.
101. Peter Carrels, Missouri River Feud Could Dry up Navigation, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 15,
1991, at C1.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. DIANA C. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER 82 (1986). An even
greater disparity exists in the average water value for navigation in dollars per acre-foot on
the Missouri. The average water value for navigation on the Ohio River was $275 per acre-
foot, while it was less than $1 per acre-foot on the Missouri. The average water value for
navigation is calculated by subtracting the operation and maintenance costs from the
savings over railroad rates for cargo shipped on each of the rivers. Id.
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that the navigation industry on the Missouri in the lower basin
generates only about $14 million annually.1 0 5  In defense of the
barge industry, the Corps claims that the mere presence of the
barge alternative forces the trucking industry and railroads in the
lower basin states to adopt lower "water-compelled rates.' 0 6 The
impact of water-compelled rates on the Missouri River region ship-
ping rates must be questioned when it is discovered that the 1989
grain carried by the Missouri River equaled only 0.7 percent of the
grain carried by competing Class I railroads in the region.'0 7
Whether spending billions of dollars on navigation improvements
to subsidize shipping rates for commodities' brokers constitutes a
good investment remains an open question.
In addition to building the navigation channel, the Corps com-
pleted construction of the six planned reservoirs on the river's
main stem in 1967. The dams are Fort Peck in Montana, Garrison
in North Dakota, Oahe on the North Dakota/South Dakota border,
Big Bend in South Dakota, and Fort Randall and Gavins Point on
the South Dakota/Nebraska border.' 8 The dams and reservoirs
are an impressive lot. Lake Oahe is the largest reservoir, followed
by Lake Sacajawea behind Garrison Dam, and Fort Peck Reservoir
with its 1,520-mile shoreline. 0 9 Garrison Dam and Fort Peck are
the two largest earth filled dams in the world.' 0 The six reservoirs
have a combined storage capacity of approximately 74 million
acre-feet of water, below the 90 million acre-feet originally envi-
sioned by the Pick Plan, but still monstrous in size."'
105. Quest for Water, supra note 61, at El.
106. Carrels, supra note 101, at C1 (quoting Paul Johnston, spokesman for the Corps'
Missouri River Division). Water-compelled rates result when railroad routes that run
parallel to barge routes are forced to compete with the lower-priced barge rates. A 1980
study reveals that barge rates averaged about 10 mills per ton-mile, while railroad rates
averaged around 38 mills per ton-mile. A rather significant 34 percent of railroad revenues
were received at rates of less than 20 mills per ton-mile. These rates probably represent
most closely those routes with barge competition. It should be noted, however, that barge
rates exclude consideration of the cost of time since barge traffic moves much slower than
rail traffic. The rate differential can be attributed to the water. While rail rates reflect the
fixed and variable costs of investment, operation and maintenance, barge rates reflect only
barge company, not waterway, costs since waterways generally have no user fees. These
rate differentials have led to calls by environmental groups and railroads for waterway user
fees to correct the perceived economic inefficiencies resulting from the government
subsidization of navigation and the -free" use of water. GIBBONS, supra note 104, at 79-80.
107. C. Phillip Baumel, A Review of the Impact of Lowering the Water Level on the
Missouri River on Missouri Agriculture, University of Missouri-Columbia, College of
Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources, May 16, 1991, and the Impact of Reduced
Missouri River Waterflow on Inland Barge Transportation, by Temple Barker and Sloan,
Inc., Nov. 21, 1990, at 14-15 (Oct. 1991) [hereinafter Review] (copy on file with the North
Dakota Attorney General's office).
108. WATER RESOURCES, supra note 8, at 8.
109. Quest for Water, supra note 61, at El.
110. REISNER, supra note 24, at 191.
111. Missouri River, supra note 4, at 28.
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The flood control component of these reservoirs has been
much more effective than their use for facilitating navigation in
the lower basin states according to the Corps' own estimates.
Spending $1.2 billion has avoided flood damage of $2.7 billion,
most of it in the lower basin states. 1 2 That sum is $600 million
more than the Corps originally claimed to be the cost of the entire
Pick Plan in 1944."' While the flood control benefits represent a
partial success story for the system, these numbers obscure hidden
costs. For instance, the Corps fails to account for the environmen-
tal costs of the dam projects in its analysis. The arid upper basin
states were forced to give up much of their most valuable river
bottom land to serve as storage sites for the reservoirs. The dams
flooded 530,000 acres, or 828 square miles, of prime land in South
Dakota alone. 14
The Bureau has not fared much better at fulfilling its ambi-
tious promises to the residents of the upper basin. Money for most
of its planned dams on tributaries in the upper basin states was not
appropriated by Congress. In South Dakota, for example, Con-
gress did not appropriate money for irrigation of more than 24,000
acres, "[a]lthough the legislation envisioned potential develop-
ment of more than 900,000 acres for irrigation in the state."' '15
Plans to build irrigation projects in Nebraska ended up being
shelved due to costs in excess of $1,000 per acre-foot of water
delivered to the dry land farmers." 6 Similarly, Congress can-
celled an already scaled-down version of the irrigation projects
associated with the Garrison Dam in North Dakota when cost esti-
mates reached $1,650,000 per farm.' 17 Besides the exorbitant cost
of some of the irrigation projects, Congress scrapped others due to
the high cost of productive land lost. The original Garrison Diver-
sion Project required losing 220,000 acres for canals and reservoirs
versus 250,000 new acres irrigated, 1 8 a net gain of 30,000 acres,
but much of the flooded land was more fertile than that slated to
receive irrigation water.
Even the planned hydroelectric power production on the sys-
112. Id. Cf. Quest for Water, supra note 61. The system provides $95 million worth of
flood control annually. Id.
113. See REISNER, supra note 24, at 192.
114. William Robbins, States Turn to the Courts for Water As the Rain-Starved
Missouri Falls, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1990, at A16. One acre is equal to 43,560 square feet
and 640 acres compose a section. One section is equal to one square mile.
115. Id.
116. REISNER, supra note 24, at 200.
117. Id. at 201.
118. Id. at 200.
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tem's dams disproportionately benefits the lower basin states.
Admittedly, the electricity produced at the dams fully satisfies
most of the electricity needs for the upper basin states, yet once
again at a higher cost to the upper basin states than to the lower
basin states. For example, the six main stem dams produce about
$85 million a year in electrical power, including $55 million in
South Dakota, but very little stays in the region.119 A majority of
the electricity produced on the main stem dams is sent out of the
upper basin states, with most of the exports going to lower basin
states. 120 The upper basin states paid dearly for this electricity as
evidenced by the loss of farm land behind the dams.' 21 By con-
trast, the lower basin states now have a cheap source of electricity
in the main stem dams in addition to the flood control and naviga-
tion benefits.
With little to show for irrigation projects and most of the elec-
tricity shipped out of the region, one of the upper basin states
attempted to salvage something from the projects by selling its
one plentiful resource-water. Even this effort failed, however,
when the Supreme Court ruled that the State of South Dakota
could not sell 20,000 acre-feet of Missouri River water to a coal-
slurry pipeline company on the grounds that the river had no
water to spare.' 22 The Court found that while Section 8 of the
Flood Control Act of 1944 specifically allowed the use of water
from Lake Oahe and other main stem reservoirs to be diverted for
irrigation through federal projects, there were no Section 8 federal
irrigation projects in operation at Lake Oahe.123 Congress has not
yet funded the irrigation projects proposed under Section 8 for
Lake Oahe. Therefore, South Dakota cannot divert water until
such a federal irrigation project is in place at Lake Oahe.' 24
Despite these setbacks and disappointments, a surprising con-
solation prize developed for the upper basin states. The huge
amounts of stored water behind the six main stem dams gave birth
to a flourishing recreation industry. Sport fishing that includes
salmon, northern pike and walleye fishing, boating, water sports
119. Robbins, supra note 114, at A16.
120. See WESTERN AREA POWER ADMINISTRATION, STATISTICAL APPENDIX TO THE
ANNUAL REPORT 45-52 (1991) [hereinafter WAPA STATISTICAL APPENDIX].
121. See generally REISNER, supra note 24, at 200.
122. ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 498-99 (1988).
123. Id. at 506-07.
124. The company wanted to use the water to pipe coal from Wyoming to Arkansas.
The railroad interests, who stood to lose important coal traffic to the proposed pipeline,
urged the lower basin states to bring the suit. The lower basin states feared that such water
sales could eventually lower the system water level to the point that it could harm the lower
basin navigation industry. Missouri River, supra note 4, at 29.
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and tourism have all benefited from the presence of the reservoirs.
North Dakota and South Dakota claim that recreation on the main
stem reservoirs brings in more than $67 million to their states.125
One economist increases the number for South Dakota to $125
million annually when he includes money spent on boats, trailers
and fishing licenses.'2 6 Regardless of the exact figures, the recrea-
tion industry brings in desperately needed money and the accom-
panying jobs to the underdeveloped region.
2. Corps' Operation of the System
The Corps' Missouri River Division operates the Reservoir
Control Center in Omaha, Nebraska which regulates the six main
stem dams and reservoirs. The Corps operates the reservoir sys-
tem on an annual cycle. Each year the reservoirs accumulate an
average of about 23.3 million acre-feet of water from melting snow
and rainfall.1 27 The Corps releases water from the reservoirs dur-
ing the spring, summer and fall to generate hydroelectric power
and support navigation below Sioux City, Iowa.
The length of the normal 245-day navigation season is
adjusted to meet changing flow levels. Navigation releases begin
in late March and run through the late fall, with gradually increas-
ing flows during the summer and fall to compensate for decreased
natural inflows from other Missouri River tributaries below the
main stem dams. Water is released from Lake Oahe at a relatively
high rate during the navigation season. In addition, these releases
generate hydroelectric power and replace the water released from
the reservoirs at Big Bend, Fort Randall and Gavins Point, where
the water supply is smaller. Releases from Fort Peck and Garrison
reservoirs are relatively low during the navigation season. 128
The Corps bases the specific release rate from Gavins Point
for navigation on three factors: (1) the navigation streamflow
targets; (2) the streamflow at the monitoring points in Sioux City,
Iowa, Omaha and Nebraska City, Nebraska, and Kansas City, Mis-
souri experiencing the lowest level in relation to its target; and (3)
inflows from tributaries below the reservoir system.' 2 9 The Corps
adjusts the release rate during the navigation season to compen-
sate for shortfalls in flow from the tributaries. These adjustments
125. Quest for Water, supra note 61, at El.
126. Robbins, supra note 114, at A16 (quoting Dr. Michael K. Madden, University of
South Dakota).
127. CORPS' MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 12.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at 14.
19921 919
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
can be made daily if necessary.' 30
During the winter months, by contrast, the Corps reduces
releases from Big Bend, Fort Randall, Gavins Point and Lake
Oahe. Increased releases from Fort Peck and Garrison maintain
hydroelectric power generation during this period. These winter
releases also prepare Fort Peck and Garrison for the spring floods
by drawing down their storage levels.' 3 1
After the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
the Corps has increased water release rates in the early spring to
control the nesting of endangered and threatened species of birds.
Two endangered species, the least tern and the piping plover, nest
along the lower Missouri River. These birds nest on sandbars close
to the river's edge in the spring. Once these nests are in place, any
increase in release rates could swamp them. Consequently, the
Corps wants to make that edge as high as possible in the spring to
keep the nests above the water level later in the summer, although
they are not above occasional releases to "bump" the nesting birds
to higher ground.'3 2 Thus, when releases are needed later in the
summer to accommodate barge traffic impaired by low flows in the
late summer, these nests will not be washed away. But these
increased release rates earlier in the spring leave less water avail-
able in the reservoirs for other purposes later in the summer. 33
The increased release rates that facilitate navigation on the
lower basin authorized by the Master Manual now threaten the
recreation industry that developed as a consolation prize for the
upper basin states. A lingering six-year drought, plummeting
water levels in the reservoirs, and a Corps policy that favors navi-
gation over recreation in operation of the reservoirs imperils the
recreation industry. The Corps continues to release water at rate
of 30,000 cfs when the inflow replenishes the reservoirs at a rate of
only 22,000 cfs.' 34 Releases late in the spring, after the walleye
have laid their eggs along the shorelines of the reservoirs, prove to
be particularly harmful. The releases drop the reservoir levels and
leave the eggs high and dry, endangering the future walleye popu-
130. Id.
131. Id. at 13.
132. Robbins, supra note 114, at A16.
133. CORPS' MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 30. The Corps' forced conversion to
concern for wildlife habitat seems a bit ironic given the havoc wreaked by the Corps on
wildlife habitat with construction of the Missouri River system. The millions of acres of
secluded bottomlands and oxbow pools and marshes lost by the building of dams surely did
more to put the least tern and piping plover on the Endangered Species list than anything
the Corps could do now to harm them. REISNER, supra note 24, at 199.
134. State of South Dakota v. Hazen, 914 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1990).
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lation. The loss of an entire spawning season, such as in 1989 and
1990, can have repercussions for years to come.
The extended drought has taken its toll on water levels
throughout the basin. The reservoirs currently hold 43 million
acre-feet of their 74 million acre-feet capacity-the lowest levels
since the system first filled in 1967.135 Some reservoir levels have
dropped by thirty feet, leaving boat marinas and domestic water
intake pipes miles from the water. The drought forced municipal
and industrial water users on the Missouri to spend about $4.5 mil-
lion in 1989 and 1990 to modify intake systems or operations to
cope with the lower water surface elevations.1 36 Even with abnor-
mally heavy precipitation levels it would take four to six years for
the reservoirs to refill if the Corps continues its present policy of
discharging water to aid navigation.' 37
The low reservoir levels and early season discharges also have
cut hydroelectric power production. Hydroelectric power output
is a function of the volume of water available and the height of the
drop of the water before it passes through the turbines. The Corps
has continued to discharge water at rates faster than it is being
replenished, and consequently, the reservoir levels were lower
than normal throughout the summer which reduced the height of
the drop of the water before it passed through the turbines.
Granted, the drought would have lowered reservoir levels any-
way, but the Corps' increased release rates in the spring to aid
navigation have exacerbated the lower water levels, particularly in
the late summer when the intake rate is the lowest. The hydroe-
lectric industry lost an estimated $40 million in 1990 as a result of
low lake levels brought about by the drought and the increased
release rates. 138 The system generated over 12.2 billion kilowatt
hours of electricity in 1987 compared to only 9.5 billion kilowatt
hours in 1990.139 Thus, the nearly twenty-five percent drop in
electricity production can be attributed mainly to the Corps' man-
agement policies which unnecessarily lowered the water levels in
the reservoirs and reduced the height of the water before it passed
through the turbines.
135. Missouri River, supra note 4, at 28. The water impounded by the six reservoirs
necessary to support barge traffic is released beginning in late March and continues until
November. CORPS' MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 12.
136. CORPS' MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 23.
137. Id. at 22.
138. Dorgan, supra note 100, at A20. See WAPA STATISTICAL APPENDIX, supra note
120, at 34 (estimating its 1991 operating loss at $46 million).
139. WAPA STATISTICAL APPENDIX, supra note 120, at 25.
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3. The Master Manual
The Corps has repeatedly responded to criticism of its main
stem operation by claiming that it is bound by the priorities estab-
lished in its Missouri River Main Stem Reservoir System Reservoir
Regulation Manual (Master Manual). Congress and the Secretary
of Interior directed the Corps to prepare a Master Manual to guide
operation of the Missouri Basin system at the time of the approval
of the Flood Control Act of 1944. The Corps insists that congres-
sional authorization would be required to adjust the priorities set
forth in it. The Corps' legal counsel claims that "any revision
involving a long term or permanent change in the operation of the
system that would serve as a significant determent to one or more
of the actual purposes or the currently settled priorities of the sys-
tem would suggest the need for prior congressional authoriza-
tion. '1 40 A closer look reveals that this has not always been the
case.
The Master Manual, first published in 1960, ranks the activi-
ties in the following order: "First, flood control; second, all irriga-
tion and other upstream water uses for beneficial consumptive
purposes; third, downstream municipal and industrial water sup-
ply and water quality requirements; fourth, equitable service to
navigation and power; [and] fifth, [hydroelectric] power genera-
tion efficiency consistent with other uses .... ",141 Last on the list
the Master Manual states, "'[i]nsofar as possible, without serious
interference with the foregoing functions, the reservoirs will be
operated for maximum benefit to recreation, fish and wildlife'. 1 42
It is constructive to note that the priorities enumerated in the
Master Manual do not coincide precisely with the priorities set out
in the Flood Control Act of 1944, upon which the Corps relies as a
basis for buttressing the authority of its Master Manual. The
Master Manual "places greater emphasis on domestic and indus-
trial water supply" than provided for in the Flood Control Act of
1944, even though the Act simply lists them as "other purposes,"
along with recreation and fish and wildlife. 4 3 The Corps' motives
for raising the priority of domestic and industrial water supply
140. OFFICE OF COUNSEL, DEP'T OF THE ARMY, THE ROLE OF RECREATION IN THE
REGULATION OF THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED MAIN STEM
RESERVOIRS OF THE MISSOURI RIVER 25 (Aug. 16, 1990) [hereinafter ROLE OF
RECREATION].
141. Id. at 16 (citing MISSOURI RIVER MAIN STEM RESERVOIR SYSTEM REGULATION
MANUAL IX-1 (1979)).
142. Id.
143. Id.
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probably stems from a desire to avoid the uproar that would result
if a drought threatened the water supplies of large cities such as
Omaha or Kansas City. This seems like a wise policy decision, but
what prevents the Corps from exercising similar discretion by rais-
ing the priority of recreation to match the superior economic posi-
tion that it occupies for the residents of the Basin?
The Corps justifies this reordering of priorities by relying on
1957 congressional hearings in which the Chief of Engineers told
committee members of the Corps' planned long-range operation
priorities for the main stem reservoirs. The Chief listed the pur-
poses of the main stem dams as flood control, irrigation, navigation
and hydroelectric power. 44 In addition, the Chief also testified
that "foftherfunctions, such as recreation and fish and wildlife, are
also a definite factor in operation planning, but are necessarily
lower in priority."'45 It should be noted, however, that it was the
Corps' own reports, prepared in 1952, that relegated recreation to
this "secondary purpose."' 46 Placing a higher priority on naviga-
tion than recreation may have been appropriate in 1952, espe-
cially since most of the reservoirs had not even been built, but
little basis exists for retaining that priority today. Particularly
since the preamble to the Flood Control Act of 1944 states that it is
the purpose of the legislation "to limit the authorization and con-
struction of navigation works to those in which a substantial bene-
fit to navigation will be realized therefrom and which can be
operated consistently with appropriate and economic use of the
waters of such rivers by other users. 147
The Master Manual also sets streamflows, measured in cubic
feet per second, that are required to support navigation because
the volume of water released for navigation normally exceeds the
amount required for any other purposes. The Master Manual does
provide contingency plans for drought conditions that permit the
Corps to shorten the navigation season as an alternative to reduc-
ing streamflows.1 48  The Corps actually implemented these
drought contingency plans during 1988, 1989 and 1990. Despite
the 10.5 million acre-feet saved through the contingency plan, the
Corps' operation of the system harmed all other uses, except flood
144. Id. at 17 (citing Joint Hearing on Missouri Basin Water Problems, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess., 419-431 (1957) (statement of the Chief of Engineers, Army Corps of Engineers)).
145. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
146. Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Julie Krenz to Attorney General,
Regarding the Status of Recreation Under the Flood Control Act of 1944 26 (Dec. 18, 1990).
147. Id. at 18.
148. CORPS' MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 14.
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control. 149
The upper basin states have lobbied unsuccessfully to change
the priorities established in the Master Manual. The Corps finally
relented to the demands of the upper basin states, however, and
began its first comprehensive update of the Master Manual in late
1989. Following much foot-dragging, the Corps accepted a 1993
deadline to complete its review of the Master Manual following
threats from Senator Max Baucus of Montana and Senator Kent
Conrad of North Dakota to delay the confirmation of Nancy P.
Dorn for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works in the summer of 1991.15 ° The Corps has conducted public
hearings throughout the Basin as part of its review process.
III. COURT CHALLENGES TO THE CORPS
A. UPPER BASIN LAWSUITS
Faced with the continued threat to the only benefits they
receive from the Missouri River system, and for some the eco-
nomic future of their states, the upper basin states are fighting
back. The upper basin states of Montana, North Dakota and South
Dakota have twice challenged the Corps' management policy that
favors navigation at the expense of recreation and hydroelectric
power production in federal court. First, the upper basin states
sought a preliminary injunction to halt the discharge of water from
the reservoirs during the spring spawning season of the walleye in
1990.151 The Corps claimed that failure to maintain the level of
the Missouri below Lake Oahe through the discharges would halt
downstream navigation, including barge traffic. The Corps coun-
tered that reducing discharges from Lake Oahe, even temporarily,
would halt navigation for the entire summer due to the presence
of two endangered species of birds, the least tern and the piping
plover. 152 Increased releases from Oahe after the June 1st date
sought by the upper basin states would inundate their nests in vio-
lation of the Endangered Species Act. 153 Thus, argued the Corps,
149. Id. at 22.
150. Tom Ichniowski and Hazel Bradford, Dorn Confirmed by Senate: Baucus, Conrad
Gain Concessions, ENGINEERING NEWS REC., July 29, 1991, at 7. In addition, the Army
promised to heed the recommendations of a General Accounting Office report on the
management of the reservoirs. The Army also promised to draft a new environmental
impact statement for the Upper Basin and to send Dorn to visit the region after her
confirmation. Elizabeth Lesly, Army Practice of Draining Fort Peck Lake May Stop After
Parliamentary Wrangle, STATE NEWS SERV., July 17, 1991.
151. South Dakota v. Hazen, 914 F.2d 147, 148 (8th Cir. 1990).
152. Id. at 149.
153. Id.
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halting the discharge now would effectively halt it for the entire
summer and with it halt the barge traffic for the rest of the sea-
son. 154 Despite stating its "'very serious doubts about [its]
power'" to issue an injunction, on May 9, 1990, a federal district
court in North Dakota enjoined the Corps from releasing water
from Lake Oahe reservoir into the Missouri River at a rate greater
than that at which water is flowing into the reservoir until June 1,
1990.155
The Corps quickly appealed the lower court ruling by filing an
emergency motion for stay pending appeal of the preliminary
injunction to the Eighth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit granted the
stay on May 11, 1990, and heard oral argument of the appeal on an
expedited basis on May 16, 1990.156 The Eighth Circuit panel
entered an order reversing the district court, specifically holding
that the Corps' actions were not arbitrary and capricious, and
questioned whether the Corps' actions were reviewable at all.' 57
Following the submittal of supplemental briefs by the parties, the
Eighth Circuit panel finally released its written opinion in the case
on September 12, 1990. In a two-to-one opinion that split along
regional lines, 158 the court articulated its reasons for the reversal
of the lower court ruling. The court accepted the Corps' argu-
ment that there is no "law to apply" in either the statutes or the
regulations.' 59 The court found that the only plausible law to
apply was the Corps' own Master Manual, a document that the
Corps claims was intended for internal use in goals set forth by
Congress.' 60 The Master Manual places navigation as one of the
primary purposes of the project, with recreation relegated to a
secondary purpose.
The upper basin states argued that a finding of
unreviewability would give the Corps "unbridled discretion over
Lake Oahe and the main stem reservoirs, a result Congress surely
could not have intended.' 16 1 Given the high stakes involved, the
panel did the only politically prudent thing-postpone the review-
ability issue until another day. The court found that since the dis-
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Hazen, 914 F.2d at 148.
157. Id. at 150. The standard of review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
is whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2XA) (1988).
158. Judge George G. Fagg of Iowa and Judge Pasco G. Bowman of Missouri voted in
the majority, and Judge Roger L. Wollman of South Dakota dissented.
159. Id. at 149.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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trict court's preliminary injunction would have expired on June 1,
1990, and that the walleye spawning season had ended, the ques-
tion before them was moot.'6 2 "'[T]he question sought to be adju-
dicated has been mooted by subsequent developments.' "163 The
court did state in dicta, however, that even if it had power to
review the Corps' actions, those actions in this case were not arbi-
trary and capricious.'6 4 While acknowledging the likely reoccur-
rence of the same issue given the lingering drought in the Basin,
the court passed on resolving the reviewability issue. As pre-
dicted, the same situation presented itself in the spring of 1991
and again the upper basin states responded with a lawsuit.
This time, however, the upper basin states filed their suit in a
federal district court in Billings, Montana, a court within the pur-
view of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 165 The pending suit
alleges similar causes of action as the first. The upper basin states
allege that the Corps operates the Missouri River main stem dams
in violation of the Flood Control Act of 1944 by failing to treat
uses, other than flood control and upstream beneficial consump-
tive uses, equally and by failing to regularly balance the competing
uses of the water to develop a plan of operation that reflects con-
temporary uses and economic needs of the Missouri River
Basin. 66 The second cause of action claims that the Corps' opera-
tion of the system abuses the discretion vested in it by the Flood
Control Act of 1944. The upper basin states argue that even if the
Corps is correctly interpreting the Flood Control Act, the contin-
ued drawing down of the water levels in the basin reservoirs to
support incidental navigation traffic in the Basin with disregard for
the substantial harm to the reservoirs as fisheries and recreation
centers violates the arbitrary and capricious standard of the
APA.167
162. Id. at 150-51.
163. Hazen, 914 F.2d at 150 (quoting Gilligan v. Morgan 413 U.S. 1, 9 (1973)).
164. Id. at 149.
165. South Dakota v. Needham, (No. CV-91-26-BLG) (D. Mont. filed Feb. 4, 1991).
Although the desire to avoid another Eighth Circuit panel with a majority of judges from
lower basin states seems obvious, one of the proponents, North Dakota Attorney General
Nicholas Spaeth, would not publicly acknowledge the strategy.
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id. at 9-10. The Corps' initial response to the latest suit was a motion for summary
judgment filed on April 14, 1992. Brief for Defendant, South Dakota v. Bornhoft, (D.
Mont.) (No. CV-91-26-BLG) (filed Apr. 14, 1992). The motion states that there has been no
final agency action within the scope of the APA, that the plaintiffs lack standing to bring the
suit, and that the Corps' operation is not judicially reviewable since such matters are
committed to agency discretion. The court has yet to rule on the motion.
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B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The outcome of the lawsuit may depend in large part on the
willingness of the court to engage in a time-consuming and ulti-
mately subjective review of the legislative history of the Pick-
Sloan Plan. Analyzing legislative history often entails an exhaus-
tive search for that elusive document, committee hearing record,
or quote from congressional debate by the bill's sponsor that
explicitly explains a bill's purpose, the proper interpretation of
ambiguous language or intent. Even under the best of circum-
stances it can be a rather dubious affair to glean the intent of a
bill's proponent from the cold pages recording the heated debate.
But in the case of the Flood Control Act of 1944, the endeavor is
even more dubious than most. Much of the debate and haggling
over the contents and thrust of the program took place behind the
scenes, as evidenced by the scant Senate floor debate on the
O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment, which occupies slightly more
than one page in the Congressional Record-and most of this
debate took place after it had already passed. s16 Moreover, in the
case of the Flood Control Act of 1944, the project proponents,
both the Corps and the Bureau, seemed willing to promise all
things to all parties. Their lobbying efforts, both in the Missouri
River Basin states before the competing plans were submitted and
within Congress, demonstrated the resourcefulness and determi-
nation of the two agencies to get the measures authorized and to
expand their own empires rather than to promote sound public
policy. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of the complexity of the
debate helps elucidate this point.
First, the O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment, designed to
appease the fears of the upper basin states that their irrigation
water could be washed downstream to float barges, does not
appear to provide any basis for the upper basin states' claim
regarding recreation. The issue of whether recreation and hydro-
electric power production qualify as "beneficial consumptive uses"
warranting priority under Section 1(b) of the O'Mahoney-Millikin
Amendment1 69 appears to be resolved. The terms "beneficial use"
and "consumptive use" are often found in the statutes of western
states that follow the prior appropriation doctrine for allocating
water rights. Traditionally, states limited beneficial uses to those
that involved diverting the water from a stream or lake and con-
168. See note 64 supra.
169. RIDGEWAY, supra note 18, at 335.
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suming for productive purposes such as irrigation, domestic use or
mining. 170 Today, however, some western states have broadened
their list of beneficial uses specifically to include recreation. 171
The "consumptive use" requirement proves more problematic for
the upper basin states. Consumptive use is generally defined as
"the amount of water consumed by a particular use and thus
unavailable for further use.' 72 While possibly being beneficial,
surely water used for recreation is still available for further use and
thus not within the general definition of consumptive use.
Nowhere in its internal memoranda regarding the case does the
North Dakota Attorney General's Office claim that recreation
qualifies as a beneficial consumptive use.
A similar controversy arose in the late 1950s involving a dis-
pute over whether hydroelectric power production in the upper
basin states qualified as a beneficial consumptive use. Senator
James E. Murray of Montana, the Chairman of the Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs at the time, commissioned a legal opin-
ion that declared that the O'Mahoney-Millikin Amendment
granted the upper basin states priority for "all beneficial uses,
including the generation of electric power, as against the use of
those waters for navigation.'1 73 The untimely death of Senator
Murray provided an opening for the lower basin states to chal-
lenge this favorable interpretation for the upper basin states. Not
even intervention by Senator O'Mahoney himself to claim that he
had intended to include hydroelectric power production under
the protective umbrella of Section l(b) of the Flood Control Act of
1944 convinced the committee to add hydroelectric power to the
list of protected activities. Senator O'Mahoney's cosmic response
to a colleague's question during debate on the issue as to whether
there was a distinction between beneficial use and beneficial con-
sumptive use and whether hydroelectric power production con-
sumes water failed to persuade many. He answered:
In the process of getting through the [turbine] structures
that are built, there is evaporation. There must be some
loss. Of course, I think strictly speaking, the water passes
through a giant circle, from the land, through the power
of the sun, to the clouds, and then to the rainfall again in
170. SAX, supra note 33, at 165.
171. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1971 & Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 90.54.020(1) (West Supp. 1992).
172. SAX, supra note 33, at 971.
173. COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 64, at iii.
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some other place. There is a continuous circle. The
water is not eventually consumed. It is returned to the
surface of the land some way. 17 4
The outcome from that dispute may help explain why the upper
basin states omitted this argument in their current lawsuit.' 75
Further analysis reveals a trend that developed during the
legislative process that works to the great disadvantage of the
upper basin states today: reasonable assurances of flexible priori-
ties to the upper basin states in the lobbying stage, followed by
vague language leaving room for maneuvering in the Joint Report
approved by Congress, and finally, operation guidelines developed
by the Corps that clearly favor the interests of the lower basin
states. Project proponents emphasized the flexibility of the devel-
opment and operation of the system as part of the total economic
development of the Basin. Statements by representatives of vari-
ous federal agencies who were asked to comment on the proposed
system indicate that the plan was forward looking and flexible to
accommodate changed circumstances. For example, the Commis-
sioner of the Bureau on the Pick Plan stated, "[t]o the extent, how-
ever, that several functions of water control and utilization are
conflicting, preference should be given to function which contrib-
ute most significantly to the welfare and livelihood of the largest
number of people. ' 176 The fledgling recreation industry did not
pose a threat to any other activities preferred by the Corps at that
time, but now the situation has changed dramatically. The $67
million a year recreation industry benefits far more residents of
the Basin than the $14 million a year navigation industry.1 7 7 Addi-
tionally, the Land Use Coordinator of the Department of Agricul-
ture added that, "[the] ultimate basin-wide plan can progressively
be developed, with full recognition given to the best utilization of
the waters of the main stream and its tributaries in accordance
with the multiple-purpose principle.' 7 8 The preliminary reports
and statements by interested parties in lobbying for the the plan
demonstrate great discretion and flexibility to adapt the system to
changing needs.
174. Id. at 15.
175. See also Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 611, 612 (1970)
("statute, on its face, does not include recreational purposes as one of the beneficial
consumptive uses . . .").
176. H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 7. See supra text accompanying notes 90-
94.
177. See supra notes 100-05.
178. H.R. Doc. No. 475, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13 (1944).
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The vague language of the Pick Plan, the Sloan Plan, and the
Joint Report accepted by the upper basin states leaves plenty of
room for discretion. The Joint Report merely listed the purposes
of the reservoirs as "flood control, irrigation, navigation, hydroe-
lectric power, and other uses," with no delineation of priorities.' 79
The decision by the upper basin states to accept these preliminary
assurances and the vague language of the Joint Report contribute
to today's conflict. The Corps took control of the system after con-
gressional authorization of the Joint Report. The implementation
of the legislation and development of programs for daily operation
of the system solidified this control. Not surprisingly then, the
Corps established preferences for those activities for which it had
traditionally been responsible: flood control and navigation."'
These ambiguities make the outcome of the pending lawsuit,
South Dakota v. Needham,'18 difficult to predict. The courts must
pick their way through the two interpretations of the legislative
history of the Pick-Sloan Plan offered by the plaintiffs and the
Corps. The massive, behind-the-scenes lobbying effort under-
taken by the Corps and the Bureau to ensure congressional
approval, compounds the ordinarily difficult task. The seemingly
vague language of the Joint Report offers the court much room to
maneuver. The statements made by officials of the various federal
agencies involved in the planning of the system could cast some
light on the language of the Joint Report. Whether the court
accepts these statements as evidence of the plan's intent could be
the deciding factor.
IV. HOW THE SYSTEM SHOULD BE OPERATED
Regardless of the outcome in the lawsuit filed by the upper
basin states, it is time for the Corps to adjust its operating priorities
for the Missouri River system. The losses suffered by all activities
on the system during the drought drive home the point that the
time is long past when the Corps should heed the mandate of the
Flood Control Act of 1944, and stop operating navigation projects
in the Missouri River Basin that do not make economic use of the
waters of the river at the expense of a healthy and viable recrea-
tion industry.
The priorities and the drought contingency plan currently
being followed by the Corps are based on economic projections for
179. S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1944).
180. REISNER, supra note 24, at 179.
181. South Dakota v. Needham, No. CV-91-26-BLG (D. Mont. filed Feb. 4, 1991).
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the uses of water for navigation and irrigation made in 1944, at the
time that Congress approved the Joint Report. 182 Both of the pri-
mary purposes authorized for the system have disappointed the
Corps. First, the navigation industry on the lower basin has not
lived up to its potential. The 12 million tons of cargo to be shipped
on the Missouri River that was projected by the Corps in 1944 has
never climbed above 3.3 million tons. In fact, commercial naviga-
tion has declined in recent years to about 2.2 million tons in 1988
and, still further, to 1.4 million tons in 1990 after three years of
drought management on the system.113 In addition to the disap-
pointing navigation industry, irrigation and consumptive uses
from the reservoirs have also not developed as extensively as pro-
jected by the Corps in 1944. The Bureau expected to irrigate
about 2.2 million acres through its diversions from Garrison and
Oahe alone. Congress later completely withdrew authorization of
irrigation projects at Oahe and scaled back Garrison to 130,940
acres, which the Bureau has not even managed to place in full
operation due to disputes with Canada stemming from the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty. 8 4
The Corps should finish its review of the Master Manual and
project operations that it began in 1989. The review will consider
the economic, environmental, social and other benefits of all
authorized purposes. Preliminary results of the review indicate
that by increasing storage levels on the reservoirs and decreasing
release rates, the Corps could increase net economic development
benefits in the basin by about $36.1 million annually.' The
higher storage levels would increase economic benefits derived
mainly from recreation on the reservoirs, hydroelectric power
production in the upper basin, and flood control in the lower basin.
Conversely, navigation would be adversely affected by these
changes in system operations.
The Corps and Bureau manipulated the multiple-purpose idea
and basin-wide accounting schemes to make construction of the
Missouri River Basin System seem economically viable. It seems
182. S. Doc. No. 247, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
183. CORPS' MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 29; Carrels, supra note 101, at 1. A Corps
analyst involved in evaluating the system's benefits to navigation users concedes that the
recent drops in cargo shipped have more to do with changes in railroad freight rates and
export markets for agricultural commodities than with the drought. CORPS' MANAGEMENT,
supra note 5, at 23-24.
184. CORPS' MANAGEMENT, supra note 5, at 30. Negotiations with the Canadian
government continue, but immediate resolution of the issues appears unlikely. The future
operation of any irrigation diversions from Garrison remains uncertain. Id.
185. Id. at 33.
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appropriate then, to use the same basin-wide principles to guide
the contemporary operation of the system. The Corps' own report
reveals that potential economic benefits for the basin are being
washed downstream with the increased release rates in the spring
to facilitate navigation. The economic projections of the 1940s
must be reconciled with the economic realities of the 1990s. Con-
sequently, the Corps must adjust the priority of water uses accord-
ing to the total economic benefit to the entire basin region derived
from the various uses.
To meet this objective, first, the Corps should immediately
implement the findings of its system operations review. Adjust-
ments should be made in the next operating season to incorporate
these findings. Barge operators would need to alter their opera-
tions during the four- to six-year period that it would take to bring
the reservoirs back to their pre-drought levels. Some operators
would undoubtedly be forced out of business, but it becomes
increasingly difficult to justify the continued subsidization of the
barge industry at the expense of other more economically benefi-
cial activities. It also remains exceedingly difficult to rationalize
the subsidy on the Missouri when maintenance costs to the naviga-
tion channel are compared to those on other rivers. A study from
the early 1970s revealed that taxpayers spent 13.9 mills per ton
mile maintaining the Missouri navigation channel, compared with
only 0.13 mills per ton mile on the lower Mississippi-more than
100 times greater. 1 6 On the other hand, barge operations would
be affected only during drought periods when insufficient water
would be available for release downstream during the late sum-
mer. It should be noted that the Missouri River has a very minor
impact on grain transportation and rail rates nationwide due to the
relatively high barge rates charged by Missouri River shippers and
the low quantity hauled on the river.187
An alternative system would be to offer cash payments from a
collective insurance fund to the barge operators during those
drought years to help offset their losses from insufficient water
levels. The Corps could raise revenue for the insurance fund
through a river user fee imposed on barge operators during years
of normal operation. Barge operators currently use the river free
of charge, except for a small fuel tax imposed on barges operating
186. Guhin, supra note 72, at 435.
187. Review, supra note 107, at 14. The Missouri River carried less than six-tenths of
one percent of the 1989 total United States grain exports. Id.
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on the inland waterway system. 18 This system could assist barge
operators in amortizing the investments that they have made in
time and equipment.' 8 9 Admittedly, this system would be highly
controversial and may drive away potential shippers unwilling to
gamble whether the barges will be operating in a given year. But
barge operators enjoy a nearly 400 percent price advantage over
their railroad competitors; this price advantage should entice some
shippers to risk the availability of sufficient water flows.1 90 More-
over, navigation season water levels normally can be determined
in the spring based on winter snow pack levels, so shippers could
discount their risk significantly by making their choices in the
spring. Further, barge operators unable to survive with a user fee
should provide an additional sign to the Corps that the time has
come to reorder its operating priorities on the Missouri.
Reordering the system's priorities could also alleviate the
endangered species problem and other environmental concerns.
Danger to the least tern and the piping plover that nest on sand-
bars along the banks of the river in the lower basin during the
spring is caused by increased release rates from the main stem res-
ervoirs after the nests are in place. The increased release rates
raise the river level and flood the nests. Establishing uniform
release rates throughout the navigation season would maintain the
rivers at a relatively constant level and leave the nesting birds
secure in their original nests throughout the navigation season.
Alternatively, the walleye lay their eggs along the shores of the
reservoirs in the upper basin during the spring. Increased release
rates in the spring to aid the navigation season drop the reservoir
levels and expose the eggs along the shoreline. These increased
releases destroyed the entire walleye spawn during 1989 and
1990. Once again, discharging water from the reservoirs at the
same rate at which they are being replenished would keep the res-
ervoir levels relatively constant. This would permit the eggs to
hatch safely along the relatively constant shoreline protect the fish
populations in the reservoirs.
Finally, the Corps should make its current review of system
operations a regular undertaking. Continued evolution of the sys-
188. The tax on fuel is scheduled to be $0.15 per gallon in 1992. A total of $48.1
million in fuel taxes was collected in 1989, compared with the $689 million the Corps spent
on navigation related expenditures during the same period. This resulted in about a $1.29
per ton subsidy for commodities shipped in 1989. Review, supra note 107, at 15-16.
189. For a more extensive discussion of economic and equity solutions to entitlement
disputes, see A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (1983).
190. See GIBBONS, supra note 104, at 82.
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tem could force additional changes in the priorities in the years
ahead. The Corps should establish a regular ten-year review
schedule of its operations to evaluate maximizing basin-wide eco-
nomic benefits from the system. The reviews should be
announced as part of the regular system operation. In this way,
the Corps could provide security of at least a ten-year period for
those industries that benefit from the existing priorities, while
adding flexibility to the system. The Corps would then have a sys-
tematic method for hearing the grievances of parties unhappy
with their operating priorities, and objective standards for sup-
porting changes to these priorities.
CONCLUSION
The tremendously diverse geography, climate and needs of
the residents of the Missouri River Basin resulted in nearly inevita-
ble conflicts over the appropriate priorities to be granted to spe-
cific uses in a basin-wide system. The mammoth size and
economic infeasibility of the chosen Pick-Sloan Plan made conflict
a certainty. The Corps' rigidity in managing the system and the
lingering drought brought this conflict barely twenty years after
the system became fully operational in 1967. The Corps' insis-
tence upon granting the localized navigation industry in the lower
basin a higher priority than the fast-growing recreation industry
on the reservoirs in the upper basin states has now brought the
conflict to a head. The many unfilled promises made by the Corps
and the Bureau to the residents of the upper basin states left them
with only a growing recreation industry to show for the millions of
acres of lost farm land and wildlife habitat that was sacrificed for
the reservoirs. Lacking political clout in Congress to pressure the
Corps to change its management policies, the upper basin states
have resorted to the federal courts for help.
The Corps' reluctance to grant recreation a higher priority
may stem more from an objective view of politics and economics
than legal constraints. The Corps' recalcitrance in the face of eco-
nomic realities may be fear of diminished future congressional
appropriations that could follow such a change. The Corps may
feel it is too risky to admit that a change in operating procedures is
needed during a time of government budget deficits. Reordering
priorities with recreation in ascending position would be an admis-
sion by the Corps that the Missouri River system and many of its
other projects in the West were not economically viable. Most of
the irrigation projects proposed for the Missouri River System
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were never developed. It would have been cheaper simply to give
direct cash payments to the potential irrigators rather than go
through with the projects. Irrigation development cannot be
relied upon to justify future projects to an increasingly budget-
conscious Congress.
The same can be said for the other rationales that the Corps
has traditionally relied upon in proposing massive public works
projects on the nation's waterways. Power production from the
system has never been great, given the low height of the dams.
Finally, the moribund barge industry on the Missouri below Sioux
City, Iowa, fails to justify the cost of the basin system allocated to
navigation. Cargo tonnages are small and declining. The Missouri
does not even begin to approach the level of barge traffic found on
the Mississippi and Ohio Rivers. The trucking industry and the
railroads have priced out barge competition except in a few com-
modities in isolated regions. Without the help from the Corps,
even these remaining barges would likely go under given the
uncertainty of flow levels and the length of the season available on
the Missouri.
The Corps would be left to admit that after over $7 billion in
spending, controlling flood damage in the lower basin and the
inadvertent development of a sport fishing industry on the reser-
voirs of the upper basin states are the major accomplishments of
the Pick-Sloan Plan. Even some members of Congress would be
unwilling to appropriate money for pork-barrel water projects if
the Corps admitted ahead of time that recreation would be a chief
beneficiary. Such local economic development projects surely
could be accomplished for less cost and without the widespread
environmental destruction that traditionally has accompanied
projects undertaken by the Corps. Perhaps now with a little more
help from the Corps the Ghost Dance prayers of the Sioux sent to
them by Wovoka will finally be answered. The white population
in the upper basin states will continue to decline and once again
buffalo will roam the Great Plains.
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